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Chapter 1: Origins and Evolution of the Vice Presidential Home State Advantage

After being elected the first vice president of the United States, John Adams
embarked upon a week-long journey from his home in Braintree, Massachusetts, to the
nation’s then-capital, New York City, on the picturesque spring day of April 13, 1789.
The 54-year old Adams, who had contributed so greatly to the government of his state
and the birth of a new nation, was treated to a “hero’s send-off” by the people of his state
and his region – punctuated by cannon salutes, municipal awards, and the gift of a locally
manufactured brown broadcloth inaugural suit – as he traveled ceremoniously with a
parade of cavalrymen and a forty-carriage caravan along the southwestern route. His
neighbors’ celebratory spirit bespoke pride and confidence not only in Adams and his
achievements, but also in the knowledge that a leader from their own stock would now
hold the second-highest office in the nation’s new system of government. And so, “All
through Massachusetts and Connecticut people lined the road to cheer Adams as one of
their own, a New England man” (McCullough 2001, 394).
While surely gratified by such celebrations – he did, after all, have a reputation
for inordinate vanity – Adams was considerably less enthusiastic than his fellow New
Englanders about the vice presidency. “My country,” he famously lamented, “has in its
wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man
contrived or his imagination conceived.”1 Indeed, by measure of actual power, it was a
rather hollow office. The United States Constitution, ratified by the requisite threequarters of states the previous summer, invested the vice presidency with minimal formal
duties. First, as “President of the Senate,” he would cast a vote in the rare event of a tie
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among senators (Article II, Section 3),2 and every four years he would open certificates
containing the votes of the various states in the Electoral College (Article II, Section 1).
Second, and most significantly, he would “exercise the Office of President of the United
States” (Article II, Section 3) under conditions not specified in the Constitution until
ratification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment in 19673 but understood, at least in
subsequent practice, to encompass presidential death or incapacity. The first set of duties
demanded little of the vice president, while the second – invoked on eight occasions4 to
date and not for the first time until 1841 – constituted his most significant governmental
function. It was with the latter duty in mind that Adams most aptly described the nation’s
second office: “I am vice president. In this I am nothing, but I may be everything”
(Milkis and Nelson 2011, 486).

Historical Perspective
Whereas the president’s power expanded, through evolving constitutional
interpretation and executive assertion, from the Washington Administration to Franklin
Roosevelt’s establishment of “The Modern Presidency,” the vice president’s
power(lessness) remained static and comically underwhelming until the mid- to latetwentieth century. In the meantime, its reputation as a dead-end job for politicians whose
only prospect of relevance lay in presidential mortality made the vice presidency the butt
of endless jokes – and not least among individuals who actually held the office. Most
famous is the story of two brothers, variously attributed to Vice Presidents Thomas
Marshall, Alben Barkley, and Hubert Humphrey5: “One became a sailor and went to sea;
the other became vice president of the United States. Neither has been heard from since.”
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The vice president, Marshall once mused, is like “a man in a cataleptic fit; he cannot
speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain; he is perfectly conscious of all that goes on,
but has no part in it” (Milkis and Nelson 2011, 486); his chief activity was “to ring the
White House bell every morning and ask what is the state of health of the president”
(Milkis and Nelson 2011, 487). After being selected as Franklin Roosevelt’s running
mate in 1944, Harry Truman gave a similar, and ultimately ironic, assessment: “The Vice
President simply presides over the Senate and sits around hoping for a funeral”
(McCullough 1992, 298-299). Death, in fact, has been a recurring theme of vice
presidential jokes. When Daniel Webster was offered the Whig Party’s vice presidential
nomination in 1848, he declined, explaining: “I do not propose to be buried until I am
dead” (Milkis and Nelson 2011, 490).
Even in recent years, despite more than a half-century of expanding vice
presidential power, the vice presidency is often described in similar terms. When asked
about the possibility of becoming George W. Bush’s running mate in 2000, John McCain
scoffed: “The vice president has two duties. One is to enquire daily as to the health of the
president, and the other is to attend the funerals of third world dictators. And neither of
those do I find an enjoyable exercise.”6 Even Walter Mondale, who is widely credited
with accelerating the expansion of vice presidential power while serving under Jimmy
Carter, refused to be considered for the Democratic ticket in 1972 because, he said:
“There is no way on earth people can take the vice president of the United States
seriously.”7
The well-known limitations of the office had a profound effect on vice
presidential selection, from the earliest years of the republic. In short, the realization that
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vice presidents would play no consequential role in governing reduced the calculus for
selecting a vice presidential candidate to one almost strictly based upon electoral
considerations. A vice presidential candidate could appeal to the national electorate, as
well as state and regional electorates, on any number of characteristics including
experience, vocation, religion, ideology, and so forth. Yet, without doubt, geography was
the most important consideration. Whether justified by a sense of shared identity,
common interest, or the prospects of energizing state and local party machines, a
perception emerged immediately and quite universally that vice presidential candidates’
most effective service was to persuade their “friends and neighbors,” through reputation
or activity, to support the presidential ticket. Voters, it was assumed, would be more
responsive to an appeal from “one of our own.”8 And so, by the early nineteenth century,
“the parties had already begun to degrade the vice presidency into a device for
geographically balancing the ticket in the election” (Milkis and Nelson 2011, 490). Even
a century-and-a-half later, “Ticket balancing to unite the party and increase its appeal on
election day continued to dominate the selection of vice-presidential candidates” (Milkis
and Nelson 2011, 496).

The Early Republic
A review of vice presidential selections throughout history is instructive in
demonstrating the significant, and in some cases seemingly determinative, role of
geographic considerations. Even in the first presidential election of 1789, geography
appears to have been a predominant factor: “Because Washington, a Virginian, was
certain to become President, it was widely agreed that the vice presidency should go to a
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northerner, and Adams was the leading choice” (McCullough 2001, 392). Washington,
who meddled little in the electoral process and did not have the responsibility of choosing
a running mate, nonetheless acknowledged this reality. According to a biographer,
“Washington remained studiously neutral” about a potential vice president, “saying only
that he would probably come from the powerful state of Massachusetts…” (Chernow
2010, 551).
Regional balance continued to be a major factor in subsequent vice presidential
selections, according to historians. In 1800, with Virginia’s Thomas Jefferson heading
the Democratic-Republican ticket, a common assumption about the running mate was
that “It would have to be a New Yorker, for regional balance.” The only “serious
question,” according to Congressman Albert Gallatin, was which New Yorker it would be
– “[Governor George] Clinton or [Senator Aaron] Burr” (Isenberg 2007, 201). Likewise,
in 1804, “The selection of Governor George Clinton of New York [to run alongside
Jefferson]… seemed a good maneuver, maintaining a North-South balance…” (Ketcham
2000, 433). And in 1812 “[Virginia’s James] Madison was glad to have on the ticket a
famous patriot able to draw Northern votes,” in Massachusetts’ Elbridge Gerry (Ketcham
2000, 523).
Broad geographic considerations (e.g., North-South balance) in time gave way to
the targeting of a specific battleground state through vice presidential selection. Supreme
Court Justice John Catron, writing to fellow Tennessean Andrew Jackson in 1840 to
argue for James Polk’s selection as Martin Van Buren’s Democratic running mate,
explained: “Our state follows men… and to a certainty can only be carried by means of a
local candidate” (Cole 2004, 357). Four years later, Polk himself made a similar
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argument to Van Buren, the man he presumed would be the nominee once more in 1844.
“The implied message” of his letter to that effect, says biographer Walter R. Borneman
(2009, 65), “was that Polk was still the vice presidential candidate Van Buren needed on
his ticket if the Democrats were to capture Tennessee’s electoral votes.” After Polk, the
“dark horse” candidate, instead won the presidential nomination at that year’s Democratic
convention, some delegates urged their party brethren to target other key states with the
vice presidential nomination. “Benjamin Butler suggested that in the interest of harmony
– as well as strong Democratic turnout in New York state – the nomination should be
offered to Silas Wright,” a U.S. senator from New York (Borneman 2009, 106). Wright
declined the nomination, which then was offered to and accepted by the former senator
from Pennsylvania, George M. Dallas. This seemed to be a good fit; “Dallas proved
acceptable to both factions [of the Democratic Party], and Pennsylvania promised to be a
proper geographic balance with Tennessee” (Borneman 2009, 107).
The emergent opposition party, the Whigs, followed suit. Part and parcel with its
efforts in each election to balance the delicate North-South cleavage that would
eventually ruin the party, Whigs targeted key states outside the presidential candidate’s
region through vice presidential selection. In 1852, for instance, Whigs chose former
North Carolina Senator William A. Graham as the running mate for Pennsylvania’s
General Winfield Scott because, in contrast to a leading rival from Maryland, “Graham
hailed from a state with ten, not just eight, electoral votes” that year; thus, “shoring up
North Carolina seemed the top priority.” Immediately after Graham’s nomination, a
delegate from that state declared the ticket now certain to carry North Carolina by at least
10,000 votes (Holt 1999, 724).
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The Republican Party, which soon replaced the Whigs as chief rival to the
Democratic Party, was sensitive to geographic concerns as well. Recognizing their
limited appeal to southern states (aside from substantial successes in the Reconstruction
Era, made possible by suffrage limitations that stifled latent Democratic dominance),
Republicans focused on balancing the party’s eastern and western power bases while also
targeting key electoral states. In 1860, the Republicans ran Hannibal Hamlin for vice
president, a “nomination [that] balanced Lincoln, a former Whig from the West, with a
former Democrat from the East” (White 2009, 331). Hamlin’s candidacy was,
reportedly, intended not only to provide East-West balance but also to enhance the
party’s performance in Maine. Because it held elections for Congress and state offices in
September, Maine was “considered the ‘finger-board’ of victory or defeat in that
presidential canvass” – with the assumption that a strong performance in the early
elections would generate momentum for the presidential vote in November (Waugh 2001,
197).

Post-Reconstruction
Never did the targeting of key electoral states influence vice presidential (or, for
that matter, presidential) selection more than in the post-Reconstruction era, when the
combination of a solid Democratic South and a Republican-leaning North and West
narrowed the electoral map to a small set of states from which both parties sought
desperately to extract any conceivable advantage – most conveniently, by selecting a
presidential or vice presidential candidate from one of those states. Between the elections
of 1876 and 1920, in fact, 17 of 24 major party presidential candidates and 17 of 24 vice
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presidential candidates (70.8% in each case) came from only three states, which also
happened to be the most significant electoral battlegrounds in the United States: New
York, Ohio, and Indiana.
Historical accounts attest to the primacy of home state considerations in this
period of vice presidential selection (and historians’ assumptions of a home state
advantage). For example:


1876 Republican (Hayes-OH/Wheeler-NY): “When the convention selected
Congressman William A. Wheeler of New York as its vice-presidential
nominee, it… achieved a balanced ticket that would run well in the crucial
states of New York and Ohio” (Hoogenboom 1995, 265).



1876 Democrat (Tilden-NY/Hendricks-IN): “His running mate, Thomas A.
Hendricks, was from an important, doubtful Midwestern state…”
(Hoogenboom 1995, 265).



1880 Republican (Garfield-OH/Arthur-NY): “It seemed obvious to a good
many politicians that the vice-presidential nomination would go to a New
Yorker, as it had in 1876, for the state was pivotal in a national election”
(Reeves 1975, 178).



1880 Democrat (Hancock-PA/English-IN): “With the party’s forces
apparently united in New York and a native son from Indiana on the ticket, a
great many Democrats were convinced they were in a superb position to gain
revenge for ‘the fraud of 1876’” (Reeves 1975, 187).



1888 Democrat (Cleveland-NY/Thurman-OH): “Governor Allen Thurman of
Ohio… did, after all, come from a populous, needed-to-win state. On that
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basis alone, his being the unanimous choice [of the convention, for vice
president] was understandable” (Brodsky 2000, 223).


1892 Democrat (Cleveland-NY/Stevenson-IL): “…[I]t was hoped that he
[Stevenson] would help the party among the western silverites in general and
in Illinois in particular” (Brodsky 2000, 274).



1900 Republican (McKinley-OH/Roosevelt-NY): “[Theodore Roosevelt] was
popular in New York, which wanted the nomination and was always a hard
state for the Republicans to carry in the national campaign…” (Leech 1959,
529).



1920 Democrat (Cox-OH/Roosevelt-NY): “…FDR’s credentials would have
placed him on any nominee’s short list [for vice president… A]bove all [he
was] a Roosevelt from New York, by far the most populous state in the Union,
with forty-five electoral votes, roughly one-fifth of the number required for
election” (Smith 2008, 178).

Post-WWII
Prominent historians also have pointed to the assumed vice presidential home
state advantage when recounting subsequent vice presidential selections. James
MacGregor Burns, the celebrated biographer of Franklin Roosevelt, explains Harry
Truman’s selection in 1944 in part by saying: “He was from the Midwest, from a
politically doubtful border state” (Burns 1970, 505). Lewis Gould, one of the foremost
historians of the American presidency, likewise explains Richard Nixon’s selection as
Dwight Eisenhower’s running mate in 1952 by noting: “California’s electoral votes might
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be crucial in a close election, and Nixon had proved he could carry the state” by winning
a U.S. Senate seat there in 1950 (Gould 2003, 330).
In fact, Gould’s (2003) history of the Republican Party, Grand Old Party,
ridicules several presidential candidates of the later twentieth century for not giving
sufficient weight to the vice presidential home state advantage when selecting their
running mates. About Barry Goldwater’s selection of New York’s William E. Miller in
1964, Gould writes: “The nominee [Goldwater] would have been better advised to have
selected a figure from a border state or the Middle West…” (364). As for Bob Dole’s
selection by Gerald Ford in 1976, “Dole added little to the Republican chances since
Kansas was safely in the GOP column…” (410). George H.W. Bush’s selection of Dan
Quayle in 1988 was also ill-advised: “Much of the appeal of Quayle… was cosmetic
since Bush was certain to carry Indiana anyway” (443). And Jack Kemp’s selection by
Bob Dole in 1996 “brought little electoral appeal to the ticket since Dole had no chance
of carrying New York against [President Bill] Clinton” (470).
Over the course of American history, the expectation of a vice presidential home
state advantage and its relevance to vice presidential selection had become so engrained
as to appear self-evident. Conventional wisdom dictated that vice presidential candidates
should be selected primarily on the basis of electoral considerations, and that the most
effective way to gain an electoral advantage through vice presidential selection was to
choose a running mate from a key battleground state whose native appeal would attract
otherwise-unsecured electoral votes. To challenge or disregard this perception when
choosing a vice presidential candidate seemed rather foolish.
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The Modern Era
The most famous example of a vice presidential home state advantage came in
1960 when Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy selected Lyndon B.
Johnson as his running mate. As a young senator from Massachusetts confronted by
intra-party division over civil rights policy, doubts about his readiness to lead a nation
engaged in the Cold War, and suspicions over his Catholic faith, Kennedy made a
difficult and, by most historical judgments, brilliant decision in selecting Johnson, then
the U.S. Senate’s majority leader and formerly Kennedy’s rival for the presidential
nomination.
Johnson’s appeal to Kennedy was multifaceted, to be sure, but no factor attracted
more attention then or now than LBJ’s potential to secure electoral votes throughout the
South and particularly in his home state of Texas, where opposition to the civil rights
policies advanced by Kennedy and the national party threatened to disrupt decades-long
Democratic regularity. The electoral opportunity was hardly lost on members of the
Kennedy-Johnson campaign. Immediately after Kennedy decided to select Johnson,
brother and campaign manager Robert Kennedy directed a campaign advisor “to add up
the electoral votes in the states we’re sure of and to add Texas” (Dallek 2003, 271). On
the campaign trail and in the press, the candidates and their supporters prominently
advertised their “Boston-Austin” alliance. Johnson, for his part, reportedly “was haunted
by his fear that Texas would go Republican and that he, on the ticket primarily to ensure
his state’s twenty-four electoral votes, would be blamed” (Unger and Unger 1999, 251).
Kennedy’s strategy seemed to work, as he won Texas by the slim but decisive
margin of 46,257 votes, or two percentage points. The victory added 24 electoral votes to
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the Democratic column, not enough to decide the election (since Kennedy had a ninevote electoral majority of 279 without Texas) but important because otherwise Nixon
might have pressed vote fraud allegations in Illinois and perhaps challenged the election
results. To the Vice President-Elect’s credit, Democrats held on to a majority of the Old
Confederacy states. Lyndon Johnson had done his job: he had delivered Texas, and the
South. Such is the judgment of history – as well as Johnson himself. Never one to be
accused of modesty, he relayed this update to Kennedy in an election night phone call: “I
am carrying Texas and we are doing pretty well in Pennsylvania [emphasis added]”
(Unger and Unger 1999, 251).
A half-century later, the legacy of the Johnson selection is a curious one. Rather
than invigorating the conviction that home state considerations are and should be relevant
to vice presidential selection, most often political commentators cite it as a coda to a
bygone era of presidential elections, a cautionary note to would-be strategists playing the
quadrennial “veepstakes.” Journalists, pundits, and campaign insiders regularly use the
Johnson selection to frame a new conventional wisdom: Vice presidential candidates
used to deliver home states – but those days are over. Examples are so common as to
defy exhaustive collection; here is a sample:


“Political historians maintain that vice presidential picks rarely matter, pointing to
the 1960 election of John Kennedy as the last time the veep candidate – Sen.
Lyndon Johnson of Texas – clearly helped pull in a crucial state.” (Christian
Science Monitor, June 21, 2004)9
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“From their war rooms, the political pros point out that the last running mate to
have any real clout at the ballot box was Lyndon Johnson, who delivered Texas
for John Kennedy back in 1960.” (The Economist, July 8, 2004)10



“Geography is not as important as it used to be. The last vice presidential
candidate chosen mainly to deliver a state’s electoral votes was Lyndon B.
Johnson, and that campaign was in 1960, a year before [Barack] Obama was
born.” (Los Angeles Times, June 30, 2008)11



“Vice-Presidential choices rarely tip the balance in an election. The last time a
Veep played a pivotal role was 1960, when Lyndon Johnson delivered Texas for
John F. Kennedy.” (Bloomberg Businessweek, May 21, 2000)12



“‘1960 was the one year where the vice presidential choice was decisive; Johnson
really helped in the south in a tight race,’ says Charlie Cook of the Cook Political
Report.” (Washington Monthly, July/August 1999)13



“Probably Lyndon Johnson was the last time a VP seriously helped carry a state.”
(Mike DuHaime, former presidential campaign manager for Rudy Giuliani;
Politico, August 18, 2011)14

Bob Ellsworth, who headed Bob Dole’s vice presidential search in 1996,
articulated the lessons of the Johnson selection most perceptively. As summarized by
Bob Woodward in The Choice: “Ellsworth believed that a brilliant pick could be found
occasionally, such as John Kennedy’s decision in 1960 to select Senator Lyndon Johnson.
Johnson helped carry some key southern states, including his home state of Texas. But
such an opportunity for a politically adroit move was rare” (Woodward 1996, 426).
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The emergent narrative about vice presidential selection, and the relevance of
home state considerations in particular, is a counterintuitive response to the Johnson
selection of 1960 and a dramatic departure from the conventional wisdom developed
throughout the first century-and-a-half of American presidential politics. All of which
begs two critical questions: 1) What changed?; and, 2) Is the perception of a vice
presidential home effect really dead?

What Changed?
Two factors have contributed to increased skepticism about the vice presidential
home state advantage and its relevance to vice presidential selection: 1) the expansion of
vice presidential power; and, 2) the selection of running mates who did not contribute to
the geographic balance of their ticket and/or came from small and noncompetitive states.
First and most important is the expansion of vice presidential power since the
mid-twentieth century. When and why this expansion took place is a matter of dispute.
Some observers trace its starting point to the Eisenhower Administration, when – perhaps
inspired by the exigencies of the Cold War and Harry Truman’s sudden and dramatically
consequential elevation from vice president to president in 1945 – Richard Nixon was
allowed to assume a higher profile in domestic decision-making and international
diplomacy as vice president. Reflecting on his role as vice president, Nixon – who, it
must be noted, had an interest in portraying his contributions as significant – described
his tenure as a turning point:
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The vice presidency had traditionally been a political dead end, and most
Vice Presidents were old party wheelhorses or regional politicians added
to balance the ticket…. Until Eisenhower completely changed the concept
of the office, the Vice President was almost exclusively a ceremonial
figure who went to the receptions and dedicated the dams the President
didn’t have time for (Nixon 1978, 104).

Nixon most clearly contributed to the prestige of the vice presidency by earning
his party’s presidential nomination in 1960, making him the first sitting vice president to
do so since Martin Van Buren in 1836. Hubert Humphrey, the next sitting vice president
at the time of a presidential election, also earned his party’s presidential nomination in
1968. Since that time, the only sitting vice president not to seek or win his party’s
presidential nomination when the incumbent president did not face reelection was Dick
Cheney in 2008.15 The vice presidency’s new function as a steppingstone to the
presidency, or at least a presidential nomination, has greatly increased its significance in
the modern era.
Most scholars, however, credit Walter Mondale with institutionalizing an active
and influential vice presidency. As described by Pika and Maltese (2013, 272), the office
“emerged from the shadows during the Carter Administration.” President Jimmy Carter
granted Mondale unprecedented access and influence in his administration, providing
Mondale with an office in the West Wing of the White House and allowing him daily
intelligence briefings and weekly one-on-one lunch meetings. Mondale also played an
active role as an administration liaison to Congress, contributing to the passage of
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national energy legislation and the Panama Canal treaties (see Gillon 1992). Indeed,
whereas “many vice presidents” – including Mondale’s immediate predecessors Lyndon
Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, Spiro Agnew, and Gerald Ford – “had previously pursued a
more substantial role in policy making, Mondale was unique in the fact that he actually
achieved it.”16
Today, the vice president’s constitutional power remains meager and yet his
influence has become significant. Recent presidents have continued to integrate vice
presidents into the decision-making and legislative processes, while also using them as
high-profile international ambassadors and campaign surrogates. The two most recent
vice presidents, Dick Cheney and Joe Biden, bear witness to this expansion of power.
Cheney exerted tremendous influence over Bush Administration policies on issues
ranging from energy to national security and war strategy. Biden, for his part, has played
a key role in shaping the Obama Administration’s domestic policy, most notably on the
2011 debt limit negotiations, and foreign policy, most notably on the war in
Afghanistan.17
The vice president’s expanded role in governance does not, however, mean that
running mates are selected on the exclusive or even primary basis of their capacity to
govern. Michael Nelson, a preeminent scholar of the presidency, says flatly: “Candidates
choose Vice-Presidents based on the sole criterion of how they can help win the
election.”18 While perhaps hyperbolic, this argument is not the same as saying that
selections continue, as in times past, to be primarily based upon geography and the
healing of intra-party wounds; rather, electoral considerations may encompass a range of
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concerns among voters about the vice president’s capacity to execute governing
functions, advise the president, and succeed the president if necessary.
Milkis and Nelson (2011, 497-498) provide a more nuanced explanation of the
vice presidential selection calculus in the modern era:

To meet the new public expectations about vice-presidential competence,
most modern presidential candidates have paid considerable attention to
experience, ability, and political compatibility in selecting their running
mates. Winning votes on election day is still as much the goal as in the
days of old-style ticket balancing. But presidential nominees realize that
voters now care more about competence and loyalty – a vice-presidential
candidate’s ability to succeed to the presidency ably and to carry on the
departed president’s policies faithfully – than they do about having all
regions of the country or factions of the party represented on the ticket.

Indeed, the two most recent presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, selected
running mates in Cheney and Biden, respectively, who utterly defied the rules of the past:
both came from predictably partisan states with the minimum number of electoral votes.
Instead of winning over home state voters, these picks seemed primarily designed to
reassure voters nationwide about the relatively inexperienced candidates at the top of the
ticket: Cheney was a veteran of Congress as well as a former White House chief of staff
and secretary of defense, while Biden was a six-term U.S. senator and chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In short, the Cheney and Biden selections
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addressed major electoral concerns about the presidential candidates that, because of the
vice president’s expanded role in modern governance, were not and need not be
geographic or factional in nature.
The preceding discussion dovetails with the second major change in the politics of
vice presidential selection: a series of recent running mates who offered no obvious
regional balance or valuable home state targets. Cheney and Biden are only the most
recent examples of such selections, not the first ones. In 1992, Bill Clinton, then
governor of Arkansas, became the first presidential candidate in more than four decades
to select a running mate from a neighboring state, in Tennessee’s U.S. senator Al Gore.19
Against all conventional wisdom, the Gore selection not only failed to balance the
Democratic ticket geographically, but also in terms of age and ideology. Yet it worked;
Clinton was elected president in 1992, and then reelected with Gore in 1996.
By breaking the traditional rules of vice presidential selection, and getting away
with it, Clinton had set a precedent that could loosen the psychological constraints of
ticket-balancing for future presidential candidates. Perhaps emboldened by the Clinton
precedent, in 2000 Bush selected in Cheney not just a running mate from a small and safe
home state but one who, at the time of Bush’s decision, was a fellow legal resident of
Texas.20 While all other recent selections have provided geographic balance – aside from
Clinton-Gore, only McCain-Palin represented the same U.S. Census region and no
running mates have come from the same regional division since 1948 – many have
offered little hope of a consequential home state advantage. In 1996, Bob Dole selected
Jack Kemp from solidly Democratic New York; in 2000, Gore selected Joe Lieberman
from solidly Democratic Connecticut; in 2008, McCain selected Sarah Palin from
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seemingly-safe Alaska (see Chapter 3 for further discussion); and, again, Cheney in 2000
and Biden in 2008 represented small states sure to vote for the party ticket anyway.
The recent pattern of vice presidential selection does not mean that geography is
now considered irrelevant to that process; as we discuss in the next two chapters, there is
ample reason to believe that perceptions of a vice presidential home state advantage
continue to influence the selection process and campaign strategy more broadly, even in
some of the cases just listed. The immediate import of these cases, and particularly the
Clinton-Gore ticket, is that they provided precedents for the questioning or outright
repudiation of geographic considerations now prevalent in public discussions of the vice
presidential selection process. For instance, in 2012 media critic and Daily Beast
columnist Howard Kurtz wrote: “In the old days, geographic balance was practically a
must. But ever since Bill Clinton of Arkansas picked Al Gore of neighboring Tennessee,
that seems less important in the media age.”21 Likewise, in 2008, Politico reporter
Jonathan Martin wrote: “Regional balance, it seems, no longer matters in a rapidly
homogenizing country. Vice presidents are increasingly picked for reasons other than
their ability to deliver their home state or region – as was the case with [John] Edwards,
Kemp, and Cheney.”22
In other words: Geography used to be relevant to vice presidential selection, but
the rules have changed. This is the new conventional wisdom. Or is it?

Is the Perception of a Vice Presidential Home State Advantage Really Dead?
Stuart Rothenberg, author of the Rothenberg Political Report and a prominent
political pundit during election seasons, published a provocative column on April 27,

19

2012, titled “Truth About Mitt Romney’s Running Mate Choice.”23 The truth referenced
in this title was that, according to Rothenberg, vice presidential candidates exert so little
influence on voting in presidential elections that then-rampant speculation over the 2012
veepstakes was essentially a waste of time. Citing Dick Cheney’s recent comment that
“it’s pretty rare” for a vice presidential candidate to influence the outcome of a
presidential election, Rothenberg says the former vice president “was reflecting the views
of most serious students of American politics.” Echoing the emergent conventional
wisdom summarized in the preceding section of this chapter, Rothenberg explains:

There are, of course, exceptions, including the 1960 presidential race
when the selection of Lyndon Johnson probably allowed the Democratic
ticket to carry Texas. But the homogenizing of American culture (via
television and the Internet) and the increased polarization of the country
and ideological purity of the two parties have made it less likely that a
running mate can “deliver” his or her state.

In conclusion, Rothenberg ridicules the ongoing veepstakes obsession. “So go ahead and
have fun if you enjoy listening to the speculation,” he writes.

Play the VP selection game at cocktail parties or around the kitchen table.
Write your comments about the best pick for Romney, or the worst, at the
end of articles on the Web. Just remember that the 2012 election is
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between President Barack Obama and former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt
Romney.

Rothenberg’s analysis is representative of the prevailing conventional wisdom
among political journalists and pundits, not only because it echoes comments detailed
earlier in this chapter about the irrelevance of the vice presidential home state advantage,
but also because he does not consistently apply the lesson so confidently advanced by
those comments. In March 2012, one month before the dismissive column just cited, the
Rothenberg Political Report featured a column, written by Stuart Rothenberg, titled
“Who Else for Vice President but Marco Rubio?”24 As the then-presumptive nominee of
the Republican Party, Rothenberg writes that Mitt Romney would “need to look for the
right running mate to help him unify the party and breathe some excitement into the
Republican ticket. In other words, he’ll need Florida Sen. Marco Rubio.” He goes on to
note that “Rubio, of course, isn’t the only Republican who could enhance a Romney
ticket” – Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell and Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal were
promising alternatives. How to choose between them? Rothenberg begins with the home
state advantage: “Like Jindal, McDonnell comes from a Southern state and should appeal
to the party’s conservative base. But Virginia is a swing state, unlike Louisiana, which
gives the popular McDonnell some extra appeal as a running mate.” Advantage:
McDonnell.
This was not the first time Rothenberg had played the veepstakes or focused on
home state considerations in doing so. In 2008, he told CNN that Virginia Governor Tim
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Kaine “makes a lot of sense” as a running mate for Barack Obama. His explanation:
“Virginia is going to be one of the two or three key states for Obama.”25
Nor is Rothenberg alone in his contradiction. Chris Cillizza, founder and editor
of the Washington Post blog “The Fix,” authored a post on August 9, 2012, titled “The
Vice Presidential Pick is Overrated. Here’s Why.”26 After observing that “The political
world – up to and including this blog – is consumed at the moment with trying to divine
the identity of Mitt Romney’s vice presidential pick,” Cillizza provides this stark
cautionary note: “The simple reality is that the vice presidential pick – viewed through
the lens of recent history – has almost no broad influence on the fate of the ticket and, to
the extent the VP choice has mattered, it’s been in a negative way.” As for
considerations of a home state or region advantage: “The most common argument for
why the vice presidential pick matters is geography. But, there’s scant evidence in recent
VP picking that geography really matters.” In fairness, Cillizza’s focus here seems to be
on the selection process more than voting behavior. Nonetheless, he labels the vice
presidential pick as “overrated,” describes the impact of running mates as neutral or
negative, and the column includes a photo with the caption: “Lyndon B. Johnson (second
from left), the last VP pick that really mattered” – from which a reader clearly draws the
conclusion that vice presidential candidates do not deliver home states or regions.
Cillizza does, however, go on to credit Al Gore with delivering not only
Tennessee but much of the south twenty years earlier:

The last vice presidential pick who could make a real argument that he
helped the presidential nominee win a swing state or one that leaned
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against his party was Al Gore in 1992. After the Democratic presidential
nominee had lost the Volunteer State by 16 points in 1984 and 1988, Bill
Clinton and Gore carried it – thanks in part to the popularity of the then
Tennessee Senator (and his father [former Tennessee Senator Al Gore,
Sr.]).

Indeed, Gore could “lay a solid claim to delivering a region for the presidential nominee,”
even though Clinton came from the neighboring southern state of Arkansas. This, in
itself, is no contradiction to Cillizza’s earlier arguments, for he explains that
circumstances have changed dramatically in the subsequent two decades. The first
change has been technological; says former George W. Bush campaign advisor and
White House press secretary Ari Fleischer, “With communications reaching everywhere
for the last two decades, the race is about the presidency, not the vice-presidency.”27 The
second change concerns recent precedents in vice presidential selection, detailed earlier
in this chapter; citing the selections of Cheney, Lieberman, Edwards, Biden, and Palin,
Cillizza concludes that the presidential nominees – and their senior staffs – “grasp the
declining importance of geography.” Apparently, the author does as well.
Not so. In 2012, as in previous election years, Cillizza authored a “veepstakes”
series for “The Fix” that evaluated and ranked top vice presidential contenders, with the
first edition coming even before the Republican presidential nomination was decided. A
look at any of these lists reveals Cillizza’s substantial and recurring focus on geographic
considerations. For instance, the inaugural edition of “Veepstakes 2012” discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of ten potential running mates, usually in three to five

23

sentences.28 Home state considerations are mentioned as pros or cons for five candidates,
and regional considerations are mentioned for one. Explaining the credentials of Marco
Rubio, who heads the list, Cillizza writes: “He’s from Florida, a major swing state.” Of
Bob McDonnell, ranked second: “McDonnell is the popular governor of perhaps the
swingiest state, er, Commonwealth in the country.” Meanwhile, Susana Martinez comes
from New Mexico , “and the Land of Enchantment is regarded as a swing state this fall;”
Paul Ryan “is from a swing state;” and, unfortunately for Chris Christie, “there’s no way
that Christie on the ticket delivers New Jersey.”
A similar pattern is found in Cillizza’s 2008 lists.29 For example, Tim Kaine “is
also the highest ranking elected official in an emerging battleground state and his
popularity coupled with Obama’s appeal to African American voters statewide and white
voters in northern Virginia could make the contest for the Commonwealth a barnburner.”
Likewise, Tim Pawlenty “has been elected twice in a Democratic-leaning state that is
almost certain to be a battleground in the fall.”

An Enduring Perception
Rothenberg and Cillizza are not unique; rather, they exemplify a profound
disconnect common if not pervasive among political commentators between how they
characterize the vice presidential home state advantage, in general, and how they apply
that knowledge to specific cases. This is not to say that they are dishonest or even wrong
in doing so; rather, it is to say that, emphatic declarations to the contrary notwithstanding,
the perception of a vice presidential home state advantage is not dead, after all.
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In Chapter 2, we provide more systematic analysis to justify this claim. We begin
by analyzing the content of “veepstakes” candidates’ profiles appearing in major media
outlets, to gauge journalists’ perception of a vice presidential home state advantage.
Then, to determine whether this perception is shared by the individuals most directly
affecting vice presidential selection, we turn our attention to the presidential campaign –
specifically, to top campaign advisors and the presidential candidates themselves.
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